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Cultures of Entitlement and Social Protection: Evidence from Flood Prone Bahraich, 
Uttar Pradesh, India 
1. Introduction: 
Amartya Sen (1999) advocates an entitlement theory as a way to understand how access to 
food is mediated in a society. Given this, Sen provides a useful lens to design and monitor 
social protection programmes, which provide for food and livelihoods entitlements in the 
context where such vulnerabilities are faced by people. As transfer entitlements (Sen, 1999) 
social protection programmes have as one of their objectives enabling poor citizens to 
overcome risks, vulnerabilities and poverty cycles (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008).  The last 
few years have seen burgeoning of social protection programmes which  have found a firm 
place in development policy moving from narrow safety nets to quasi-welfare programmes 
and enabling growth (Devereux, McGregor and Sabates-Wheeler 2011; Barrientos, 2012). 
Transformative social protection based on social contracts between citizens and states, that 
transforms conditions of underlying vulnerabilities and poverty is advocated (Devereux et al 
2011, Devereux and Lund, 2010; Chopra and te lintel, 2011; Tessitore, 2011; Ehmke, 
2011;Sabates-Wheeler and Koehler, 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2007).    ILO’s 
189 member countries unanimous adoption of social protection floors on 14th June 2012 is a 
significant step in that direction and is hailed as a new global social contract (Durojaye, 2015, 
Ginneken, 2011).  
 This citizen rights and social contract based normative conception of social protection sits 
well with Sen’s own entitlement thesis which is derived mainly from the discourse of formal 
rights enjoyed as entitlements by the citizenry through social contract (Sen, 2010), and with 
Sen’s own transformative project that calls for changes in their entitlements in ways that 
enables adequate food and livelihood security for all.   
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Yet, the current emphasis on social protection as legal entitlements performed through social 
contracts between state/citizen relationships has its own limitations. For example, Plagerson, 
Harpham and Kielmann (2012) show that cash transfers in South Africa have at the best led 
to weak social contract relation between its beneficiaries and the state. Evidence from our 
research on reach of social protection programmes in Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, India, 
shows that in places where social contract does not work effectively, those who are 
culturally entitled reap maximum benefits.  Following from this, our paper’s main 
theoretical contribution is to highlight the gaps in the current social contract and 
entitlement based framing of social protection thus calling for its reinterpretation.   
India has a plethora of social protection programmes, however, as this paper will show these 
programmes do not always reach the poor – they have both inclusion and exclusion errors.  
As a result, the social protection programmes are not able to fully meet their stated objectives 
of enabling access of food and livelihoods to the most vulnerable.  
A literature review of studies, both global and India focused, identifies various operational 
gaps for the inclusion and exclusion errors, namely: a) political clientalism b) exclusion due 
to social vulnerability c) elite capture d) targeting inefficiency e) leakages and corruption and 
f) lack of information and transparency g) Improper designing of social transfers: universal or 
targeted, conditional or unconditional, cash or kind  
Our evidence from Bahraich, India, identifies another problem that leads to inclusion and 
exclusion error, namely the uncritical application of the concept of entitlement to social 
protection programmes. We argue that Sen’s concept of entitlements needs to be understood 
in the context of the social, cultural and political factors that constitute cultures of 
entitlements, thus calling for their re-interpretation in their application to social protection 
programmes.  
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In order to place this papers contribution in the context of the current global and India 
specific literature on social protection programmes, we summarise the findings from this 
literature review.    
1.1 Social protection programmes, its operationalisation, and inclusion and exclusion 
errors: Critical literature review with a focus on India 
In this subsection, we discuss factors identified by the literature on social protection 
programmes that lead to inclusion and exclusion errors: 
1.1.1 Political clientalism: This is linked with people being able to access resources due 
to their connections with local politicians and state patronage of groups for their political 
loyalty (Berenchot, 2010; Walton, 2009). In West Bengal, India, people who are affiliated 
to local ruling party are able to get more benefits than others through the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Programme1 (NREGA), one of the biggest social protection 
programmes in India (Das, 2015). Hickey (2008) also notes that coverage of programmes 
in Africa may be led by political clientalism. However, in some cases, the political 
clientalism can also be benevolent to all in so far as government implements social 
protection programmes effectively with the idea of gaining votes in return from the 
people, as observed with a measure of success in Tamil Nadu (Carswell and Neve, 2014), 
Andhra Pradesh in India (Maiorano, 2014) and in Brazil in the context of Bolsa Familia 
programme (Fried 2012, Barrientos, 2013) and South Africa in the case of social grants 
(Plagerson, Harpham and Kielman (2012).   
1.1.2 Social vulnerabilities: In South Asia in general, socially excluded groups are 
marginalised and overlooked in implementation of social protection programmes 
                                                          
1
 This social protection programme is undertaken under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005), 
legislated by the Indian government which gives 100 days of employment to every rural family in a year.  
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(Kabeer and Cook, 2010). In relation to India, caste can be a barrier  with lower caste 
persons unable to access social protection due to discriminations (Bosher, Penning-
Rowsell and Tapsell 2007; De Haan, Dubey and Sabharwal 2009; Thorat and Sadana, 
2009; Haddad, Chandrashekhar and Swain 2012; Mamgain and Diwakar, 2012).  
Improper designing which does not take into account women’s social constraints 
hamper their participation in social protection programmes as evidenced in South 
Asia by Kabeer and Cook, (2010); Sudarshan, Bhattacharya and Fernandez (2010) 
and in Peru and Ethiopia by Holmes et al (2011). Social protection programmes 
continues to be gender blind in practice with dearth of gender disaggregated 
monitoring and evaluation indicators (Akerkar, 2007; Jones and Holmes, 2011). 
Elderly persons without education are also more likely to be excluded from pensions 
(Kaushal, 2014). Elderly people in rural areas and from ethnic minorities and women 
were found vulnerable to exclusion from social protection support in West Africa 
(Parmar et al, 2014). Poorer screening processes for ascertaining disabilities can also 
lead to high exclusion errors for people with disability as found in  cash grants given 
in South Africa, Uganda and Zambia (Mitra, 2010; Schneider et al, 2011) and Africa, 
Latin America, Asia, including India (Palmer, 2013; Gooding and Marriot, 2009). 
1.1.3 Elite Capture:  
Elite capture refers to a process where local elites are able to capture developmental 
resources due to their ‘disproportionate access to social, political and economic 
power’ (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007, p.230). Local elite can design and implement 
social protection programmes in ways that excludes poorest as shown in the case of 
Maharashtra, India (Pelliseri, 2008). Due to their external contacts, powerful castes in 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, India are able to capture government resources (Parker and 
5 
 
Kozel, 2007). Panda (2015) finds that political elite capture is ubiquitous in India, 
with better off monopolising the government benefits (Jhabvala and Standing, 2010).  
This elite capture is not inevitable, and can be thwarted through local capacity 
development and organisation of marginalised groups as experienced in some cases  
in Indonesia, Tanzania and India (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Lund and Saito-Jensen, 
2013). 
1.1.4 Targeting efficiencies: Targeting criteria to identify the poor can play a crucial 
role in inclusion and exclusion errors. The questionnaire used to identify below 
poverty line (BPL) persons in India has been critiqued for its imprecise method of 
scoring and for providing low quality data  (Alkire and Seth, 2008, 2013; Ram, 
Mohanty and Ram  2009; Roy 2011; Saxena, 2009, Mahamalik and Sahu, 2011).  
Study by Skoufias, Lindert and Shapiro (2010) which analysed 56 social transfer 
programmes in Latin America and Caribbean shows redistributive impacts can be 
made through targetting efficiency.  Obstructive legislations can create wrong 
ineligibility criteria, for example widows in Rajasthan who are not able to access 
widow pensions should they have adult sons (Dutta, 2013). 
1.1.5  Leakages and corruption: Often poor people are powerless in exposing 
irregularities, with powerful groups manipulating programmes for their gain, through 
cuts/siphoning from people’s wages in NREGA (Kabeer, 2002; Deshingkar, Johnson 
and Farringdon, 2005; Reddy et al,  2010); Corruption and leakages work in large part 
of Public Distribution System (PDS) in India, where in highly subsidized food grains 
does not reach the targeted Below Poverty Line (BPL) families; and is sold in black 
market (Saxena, 2012). According to Dreze and Khera (2015) PDS leakages were as 
high as 30% in 2011-12. Leakages were also found in social pension distribution in 
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India (Dutta, Howes, and Murgai, 2010). Although attempts to   decrease leakages 
have been made in India through use of ICT; digitalised service delivery system, 
biometric cards, mis-appropriations have continued suggesting that they are not fool 
proof systems ( Reddy et al 2010; Masiero, 2015). Attempts to decrease leakages 
through participatory decentralisation are also not full proof as villagers can be 
accomplices in local networks of corruption (Veron et al, 2006).  
1.1.6 Lack of information and transparency: Exclusion errors can also be caused due 
to lack of information and awareness about the entitlements, social protection 
programmes (Kabeer, 2006; Mishra, Behera and Nayak  2010; Saxena, 2012). 
Unfamiliarity of the poor with access processes leads them to give bribes and long delays 
in qualifying for the benefits (Harris-White, 2010). Transparency and better information 
access to poor can improve their inclusion, although it is found that despite such 
improvement, better off persons benefit more from the programme as they have better 
access to information (Ravi and Engler, 2015; Shankar, Gaiha and Jha, 2011 ).   
1.1.7 Improper designing of social transfers: whether universal or targeted, 
conditional or unconditional; cash or kind  
Although it is contended that universal programmes are better than targeted programmes 
in reducing exclusion error, it is the cost benefit analysis that determines the design in 
developing countries (Dreze and Khera, 2010; Slater, 2011; Kabeer, 2014). The case of 
India shows that both universal but conditional NREGA programme and the targeted 
PDS, pensions and other social protection programme have problems as discussed above. 
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In the last few years, cash transfers have been lauded for their success in different 
countries2. More recently in 2015 there have been a push in India to replace foodgrain 
transfers via PDS to cash transfers, with  a governmental committee  recommending the 
same  to curb leakages and targeting errors. Critical economists and right to food 
campaign in India3 have rejected this claim and questioned the move to cash transfer 
(Sinha, 2015; Ghosh, 2011; Shah, 2008).   
To conclude, the critical literature review identifies a range of above factors debated for their 
contribution to the inclusion and the exclusion errors. This paper makes a new contribution 
to this existing literature by showing that the errors are a result of a more fundamental 
assumption underlying entitlement and social contract based approach to designing of 
social protection programmes. It argues that entitlement and social contract thesis 
operate within the realm of formal rights, ignoring the impacts of the non-formal 
entitlements and claims, or cultures of entitlements evidenced in the empirical study 
examined in this paper.   
In the next section we develop a conceptual framework to highlight how cultures of 
entitlement and social protection outcomes are related.  
2. Social protection programmes and cultures of entitlement: Uncovering the 
conceptual link 
2.1 Social protection as legal entitlements and their limitations  
Sen identifies four kinds of legal entitlements that a person may have, namely production 
based (land based food production), trade based (exchanging/selling what one owns to earn 
                                                          
2
 See Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010).For further examples, see cash transfers in Malawi ( Miller and 
Tsoka, 2012; Miller, Tsoka, Reicher, 2011); Bolsa familia in Brazil and Mexico’s Oportunidades  (Davies and 
McGregor, 2009; Barrientos, 2013) 
3
 Right to Food campaign is a coalition of NGOs, social action groups in India and promotes the fundamental 
right of citizens to be free from hunger. See http://www.righttofoodcampaign.in/ 
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income/food), own labour based (sale of one’s labour to buy food), inheritance based and 
transfer-based (securing food/income from other sources, such as governments) (Sen, 1999; 
Devereux, 1993). As stated in our introduction, it is the transfer entitlements given in the 
form of social protection programmes by the governments to its citizens that are the focus of 
this paper.   
The concept of social protection as legal entitlements and as abstract rights in citizen-state 
social contract implies a particular mode of agency on the part of the citizens. Indeed it is 
expected within the social contract that citizens will ensure their inclusion in state 
programmes, and reap its benefits successfully. They entail a notion of ‘self’, ‘sociality’ and 
an ‘agency’ which is responsive to a particular rule of a rights game entailed in the citizen 
rights discourse (Cowan, 2006). In this conception, the atomised self as a bearer of rights is 
infused with moral individualism, which is dis-embedded from the social relations in which it 
operates. With its emphasis on the abstract conception of entitlement as legal rights, this 
conception does not engage with ‘what is’, that is entitlements as they work on the ground 
and hence is unable to account in its entitlement framing the ‘dynamic back and forth 
movement between theory [legal entitlements as abstract rights] and data [empirical reality of 
how entitlements are grounded]’ (Cowen, 2006, p.11, explanation our). Hence such 
theorization is unable to develop conceptual tools necessary for reflection of such movement. 
The empirical study in Uttar Pradesh, primarily observes and analyses ‘what is’ that is how 
entitlements work on the ground rather than what the entitlements ought to be in theory. It 
analyses the meanings of entitlements for the people living in these specific contexts 
(Strathern, 2004). Reflecting on this empirical evidence, the paper comes up with a 
conceptual framing of entitlement outcomes that takes into account the socially embedded 
nature of agency, shaped by the social relations and constituted through the operation of the 
social, economic and cultural norms, namely the moral economy and local political economy. 
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It shows how access to social protection as entitlements is mediated through such norms, 
thereby proposing the concept of cultures of entitlement to capture this politics of access.   
2.2 Conceptualising the concept of cultures of entitlement: 
The concept of cultures of entitlement proposed by this paper, argues that in several societies 
in Asia and Africa, including India, which has significant subsistence economies; and where 
modern and traditional lifestyles live side by side (Chakrabarty 2000, 2002), entitlements as 
claims are mediated through multiple notions of rights and social relationships of power. The 
multiple notions of rights imply that legally authorised entitlements and rights are not the 
only moral category used to make claims; rather there are socially mediated moral claims 
which also make their effect felt in the society. As social relationships of power, moral 
economies and local political economies also affect the way in which entitlements are 
realised by people.  
In this sub-section, we further develop the concept of cultures of entitlement, by drawing 
upon the works of James Scott, Charles Gore, and Partha Chatterjee.  
The importance of moral economies in rural settings is highlighted by Scott (1976) in his 
work with the peasants of south-east Asia.  The moral economy entails notions of economic 
justice and highlights rights and obligations arising from a set of social arrangements such as 
patron-client relation between landlord-sharecropper/landless person (Scott, 1976). Platteau 
(1995) notes that such patron-client relations are of common practice in rural areas of Asia. 
The notion of moral economy suggests that socio-economic structures are affected by 
morality, conventions, norms and values: that is normative structures existing in society 
which inform the perceptions of what is acceptable, legitimate and proper behaviour within a 
context of socio-economic relations. That is socio-economic relations are “structured by 
moral-economic norms about rights, entitlements, responsibilities and appropriate behaviour” 
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(Sayer, 2004 p. 3). They are culture specific norms for ordering social or interpersonal 
relations. Scott’s work in general shows the importance of moral economies, and their 
potential effects on local socio-economic arrangements. Further, moral economies are also 
gendered in the sense that gendered norms are played out in the field of socio-economic 
relations of that context (Kabeer 2006). More generally, the notion of moral economy 
highlights how notions of entitlements or claims have a local genesis and hence arguably 
might be in variance with the state’s notions of entitlement, as the data from this case study 
will show.   
We further extend the use of moral economy in our entitlement analysis by drawing upon the 
work of Charles Gore, who in 1993, had argued that entitlement analysis as described by Sen 
was not enough, as it was too legalistic in its content. Gore critiqued Sen for not taking into 
account the non-governmental sites in his entitlement analysis and for under-estimating ‘the 
role of socially enforced moral rules in constraining and enabling command over 
commodities’ (Gore, 1993, p. 443).  Gore, hence argued that entitlement analysis ought to 
‘analyse the interplay between state-enforced legal rules and socially enforced moral rules in 
constraining and enabling command over commodities’ (Gore, 1993 p. 451). Extending 
implications of Gore’s argument to our analysis, we develop our conceptual framework and 
undertake empirical analysis which shows precisely, how the state led social protection 
entitlements, moral economies and local political economies actively intersect with each 
other to produce the entitlement outcomes.  
In the context of India, Partha Chatterjee (2004) extends our understanding of how 
entitlements work in practice, namely in places where citizen-state social contract does not 
work to its fullest. Chatterjee argues: 
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‘Most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and 
contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution’. (Chatterjee, 
2004 p.38). 
This leads Chatterjee to develop the concept of political society as opposed to the civil 
society as understood within the state-society social contract. It is in this political society, 
unruly entitlement practices, that is claims made and realised not necessarily based on law or 
administrative procedures take precedence over formal entitlements.   Our study of politics of 
access to social protection engages with such unruly entitlement practices that are outside the 
domain of claims of formal entitlements. 
Our analysis of the politics of access to social protection shows that poor people in general 
share a paradoxical and conflictual political relation with the Indian state. On one hand, they 
appreciate the importance of the state’s role as a distributor of welfare and social protection 
programmes, important for their well-being, on the other, they also experience a 
disenfranchised relation with its representatives, namely its bureaucracy, and local officials 
who do not allow them to enjoy and access the state entitlements due to them.  As the paper 
will show, for people from our researched village, the idea of abstract state-citizen social 
contract has little meaning, rather it is their actual moral contracts with the elite patrons in 
their village that helps them ground their entitlement claim. As these socio-cultural claim 
processes are arguably outside the state-civil society claim, they are more a part of the 
political society conceptualised by Chatterjee . In our research area, we find that entitlements 
are actualised through factors such as moral and local political economies, and people’s 
abilities to negotiate within these domains. We thus extend Chatterjee’s idea of political 
society to the domain of entitlements and further critique the linear framing of social 
protection as legal entitlements framed through the idea of state- citizen social contract, 
drawing attention to the messy reality of cultures of entitlement.    
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To summarise, we term this politics of access to social protection as cultures of entitlements. 
We deliberately choose to highlight this process by introducing the concept of cultures of 
entitlements rather than an invocation of social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995; Narayan, 2002; 
Woolcock 1998) as an explanatory variable, as it captures a more complex narrative about 
how social protection entitlements are accessed in practice.  Recent work on social capital in 
India also highlights the problems involved in uncritically connecting social capital with 
development gains. For example, they show the problems of isolating behaviours of 
communities as social capital delinked from the socio-economic relations within which such 
behaviours emerge (Mosse, 2006; Levian, 2015). Mosse (2006) argues that an emphasis on 
social capital as an explanation does not tell us much about how it came into being in the first 
place and its related contextual significance. In our view, the contextual significance of the 
complex interactions between moral economies, local political economies and social 
protection programmes, is better captured through the concept of cultures of entitlement than 
isolating social capital as an explanatory variable. 
This conceptual framing of the links between social protection, cultures of entitlement and 
entitlement outcomes can be depicted as follows in figure 1:  
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Figure 1: Cultures of entitlements and entitlement outcome (EO) 
The above conceptual framework  shows that the idea of formal entitlements may not be 
enough for the designing of effective transfer based entitlement programmes as it does 
not take into account situations where the state-citizenry social contract does not work 
to its fullest, and where non-state rules and obligations trump over the former. That is 
situations where irregularities in access to social protections primarily arise from local 
cultures of mediation through which state entitlements are acquired. In the following 
section, the case of Ghagrapur village, in Uttar Pradesh, India is analysed to uncover the 
empirical linkages between cultures of entitlement and their impact on social protection 
programmes.  
3. Case of Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh India: an ethnographic inquiry into the working of 
social protection programmes 
3.1 Background to the field work sites: Bahraich District, selection of researched 
villages, and research question 
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The research study was carried out in the villages of Bahraich district, Fakharpur block, Uttar 
Pradesh to understand the social impacts of disasters, namely floods and erosions in the area 
caused by river Ghagra, a Himalayan river. Four most affected flooded villages were chosen 
for the study in 2007 based on discussions with the district officials. They were: Laxmanpur, 
Mithapur, Ghagrapur and Baundi4. A sample of 318 households was surveyed in these 
villages from 1-15th October 2008. Further, qualitative field work was carried out in these 15 
days, which included focus group discussions (FGD) with groups of men and women, 
pradhans (village elected heads).  
In addition to this data collection in four affected villages, the first author used one of the 
village site Ghagrapur for her extended PhD field research. She stayed in the researched area 
between August – December 2008 and revisited the researched village in January 2011 for 
further discussion on her qualitative findings. The research question studied is:  
What are the effects of the state supported entitlements on people’s ability to overcome food 
and livelihood vulnerabilities experienced due to floods and erosion?   
3.2) Data collection methods, field work and analysis 
The extended PhD research field work done during August- December 2008 and January 
2011 has used ethnographic research methods.  During her stay, in August 2008 the village 
Ghagrapur experienced further intensive flooding and erosion, following untimely rains in the 
Himalayan region. This led her to witness first-hand how respondents from Ghagrapur coped 
with food and livelihood issues following floods and erosion and the role played by social 
protection in the same.  
                                                          
4
 Villages Laxmanpur, Mithapur, and Ghagrapur are fictitious names of three villages. Baundi retains its original 
name as one of the village studied. 
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The ethnographic research methods included in-depth interviews and informal conversations 
with key informants from Ghagrapur (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1989; Burgess, 1991, 
Lofland, 1976). In all 19 key informants  from different socio-economic groups in Ghagrapur  
were met regularly throughout field work period. More in-depth interviews were also 
conducted with government officials at Lucknow and at Bahraich. Further, additional 35 
disaster narratives were collected to capture people’s experience following the August 2008 
floods. Participant observation was also used to understand the dynamics of flood/erosion 
impacts and how people had coped with them. This was primarily done by ‘hanging out’ in a 
particular place in the village where people gathered for spontaneous debates and social chats 
through the day (Woodword, 2008 p. 538; also see Forsey, 2010).  
Key informants chosen for the in-depth interviews and informal conversations followed a 
spontaneous as well as conscious selection processes: spontaneous because key informants 
showed active interest in the research, and conscious because, respondents from different 
caste and socio-economic groups, were selected paying close attention to the way in which 
social groups identified and dis-identified themselves from each-other. The main social 
identification used was caste, with groups identifying themselves and others as upper castes, 
intermediate castes, and the former untouchable or low castes. Caste is an ascribed system of 
stratification based on one’s birth in a particular caste. It constitutes a system of 
differentiation based on a hierarchical value attached to each caste (Gupta, 2000). 
The caste groups identified in the village were: Firstly, Brahman-Thakurs which traditionally 
form the upper caste or dominant castes; were originally landed class, but several of whom 
have now lost the bulk of their lands due to erosion by the river Ghagra; Secondly, the 
intermediate castes consisting of Gudiya or Kevath, Luniyas, and also Ahirs, Kurmis are 
classified as Other Backward Classes (OBC) by the government. They have traditionally 
engaged in different occupations such as Ahirs doing pastoral work; Gudiya or Kevath 
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engaged in fishing, rowing of boats, or doing richer people’s housework; Kurmis and Luniyas 
involved in agricultural work. Thirdly, the lowest of the caste hierarchy and traditionally 
doing the menial work; the former untouchable caste namely the Phasis and the Chamars, are 
classified as Scheduled Caste (SC) by the government. The village also had a few Muslim 
households classified as OBC by the government, given their traditional artisan based 
occupations such as weaving5. All households observed rules of taboos in cooked food 
exchange between them based on religion, caste and perceived social hierarchy.  
Given these social groups, gender, caste and religion were important criteria in selection of 
key informants.  
The main social protection entitlements to the flood/erosion affected persons were under 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), special cash/kind relief support as 
mandated by Disaster Management Act of 20056, subsidized food and pension schemes7.  
In the next section we develop the narrative about the politics of access to social protection 
through our thematic findings. We do this by starting with an example about how moral 
economy, local political economy, gender and caste mediate access to social protection 
benefits, such as NREGA. This is followed by a discussion on the role of gatekeepers in 
accessing social protection programmes, and people’s relations with the state representatives, 
namely the local officials, highlighting their trust deficits with the same. Building upon this, 
the last subsection elaborates the complex negotiating strategies employed by the poor to 
                                                          
5
 The use of this caste categories is for sociological purposes and does not in any way denote our agreement 
with the caste hierarchy.    
6
 An analysis of the current Uttar Pradesh government’s orders on norms to give relief supports after floods 
and erosion shows that the eligibility criteria and procedures to access them has remained unchanged since 
our field work in 2008. The only difference is that there is some upward revision of the amount of cash relief 
support given. In the case of NREGA also, the norms and procedures of access to work for 100 days remain 
unchanged since our field work in 2008, the only change being an upward revision of the minimum wages paid 
on this work.  
7Pension schemes include pensions for elderly, widows and people with disability. Eligibility and procedures to 
access these pension schemes remain unchanged since our field work. 
17 
 
access social protection benefits, namely mobilizing of the moral contracts of reciprocal 
exchanges with influential patrons in the village.  
 
3.3)  Key Thematic Findings: 
3.3.1 Accessing social protection: Gendered moral and local political economies and 
right to work 
One of India’s flagship social protection programme is NREGA, which gives rural 
households a right to 100 days of work, was implemented in Ghagrapur. Despite the policy 
guideline which mandates 33 percent of the workforce should be women, women were 
unable to gain employment under the programme. Sonadevi, a landless widow, from an 
intermediate caste group and about 55 years old lived on her own in the village of Ghagrapur. 
Although Sonadevi needed work, particularly as after floods and failure of crops, there was 
not much farm wage labour work to go around, was unable to work on NREGA: 
’Under guarantee [NREGA], they dig the soil.  How can I do it? I can’t do it. But 
once the soil is dug, I can carry it ... but we are not called for work. If we are called, 
we will go to work with our tokri [carrying or head loading basket] ... but the 
Pradhan8 [elected village head] says, how can you do this work? ... Here men get 
more government work. They can work on embankments, on guarantee work’.  
                                                          
8Village Ghagrapur had elected women Pradhan as the seat was reserved for women. However, in practice, the 
son of the Pradhan acted as Pradhan and participated in all the village meetings taking decisions as Pradhans. 
Thus although a woman was de jure Pradhan  it is her male son who was de facto Pradhan and took all decisions 
in relation to NREGA or other social protection programmes such as identifying and preparing the list of the 
beneficiaries of these programmes and implementing them. For the purpose of the analysis, given that the 
villagers and key informants considered the son as the Pradhan, he will be treated as ‘Pradhan’ created as such 
through de-facto rather than de-jure means. Such practices, also seen in neighbouring villages, in general can be 
seen as indicators of female marginalisation in decision-making in public spaces in the researched area. 
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These words by Sonadevi show that despite her need, and her willingness to do work such as 
carrying soil, once dug, she was not employed on the NREGA work in the researched village.  
In the village, upper castes women follow semi-purdah and do not go out to work in public 
spaces, a practice symbolizing notions of honour among upper castes. However women from 
intermediate and lower castes go out to work in public places, although they also have codes 
of honour about what kind of work they can do. 
 In this case, the Pradhan, who belonged to the Thakur – upper caste, has extended his notion 
of honour to the governmental work effectively discriminating against women from other 
caste groups who otherwise worked as labourers on farms, and wanted NREGA work. 
Seema, aged 30 years and from former untouchable caste, also wanted to work, but was not 
able to, as she asserted ‘Our Pradhan says “Taking women along with me for work, is a 
shame. It is like losing my honour …. How can I take women along with me for work”? Her 
husband, Raghu, aged 35 however was sympathetic to the Pradhan’s point of view and 
explained in an empathetic tone: ‘You see he [Pradhan] feels sharm [shame] in taking women 
to work’. Thus notions of honour and shame concerning women’s work and a male bonding 
on the issue between men in influential position such as Pradhans and village men played an 
important role in excluding women from accessing work.  In other words, moral economy, 
namely moral ideas of shame and honour were used to distribute state entitlements like 
NREGA  in these villages. Further, had women done NREGA work, they would have gained 
equal wages as per the NREGA policy guideline. This potentially could have led them to 
challenge the unequal wages that they get on agricultural work in the village. Thus, excluding 
women from NREGA can also be called as an effect of local political economy given that the 
Pradhan is a landed elite. This finding is also confirmed by Khera and Nayak (2009) who 
show that across all the states, Uttar Pradesh has lowest women’s participation, and that in 
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places where women have participated in NREGA, it has led to their upward revision of 
wages in farm sector.  
  
3.3.2 Social protection programmes, its gatekeepers and trust deficits  
Although 100 days of work is the legal entitlement of all households as per the NREGA act, 
in practice, the villagers (men) from Ghagrapur said that they had got work for only 30-40 
days in the year. Pradhan alleged that they did not get enough money to ensure work for 100 
days for every household. People also alleged misappropriation of funds, and felt that the 
money for NREGA was siphoned off by the officials. Further, job cards where entry for 
work, cash and wages were made were kept by the gram panchayat9 officials and not given to 
the people: this non-transparency creating further mistrust in the minds of people. Similar 
problems have been identified in the implementation of NREGA nationally in an evaluation 
survey undertaken by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (2008)10, and Reddy et al 
(2010).   
While the NREGA programme was generally appreciated for its objectives and potential to 
give work to the unemployed, people did not believe that they will fully benefit from them 
due to the leakages in the funds through the bichuniya (middlemen or intermediaries). The 
middlemen were considered to be the main problem for all government social protection and 
welfare programmes. People who needed work, were aware of the benefits from the NREGA 
and other schemes, but did not feel empowered enough to go to the district administration 
with their complaints and demand the access to these schemes.  
                                                          
9Gram panchayats in India are the lowest tier of elected body in India and have village level representatives. 
10This survey which was taken in 20 districts across various states records that on average the works was given 
for 35 days, had issues of financial leakages and non-transparency in the ways in which job-cards were kept and 
controlled by the gram panchayat and the government officials. 
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Consider what Laxman, from a scheduled caste, aged 36 years and Sonadevi a widow, aged 
55 years and from kurmi, an intermediate caste had to say when asked as to why they did not 
go to seek justice with higher officials in the government as they felt that relief and 
development benefits for them were creamed off by the middlemen or bichuniya: 
“Sonadevi: Nobody hears poor people’s voice. Poor do not get a sunvaiyi (hearing for 
justice) 
Laxman: Yes, rich people go ahead, while the poor people are pushed out. 
Author: on the basis of caste? 
Laxman: Yes, caste is also considered. For example, Thakurs have a name, but the 
voice of a poorer Thakur is not heard as much as rich Thakurs.  
Author: what is sunvaiyi? 
Laxman: Sunvaiyi means I have told you my problem, and you have looked into it. 
But instead what happens is that you just yell at me as in English and say ‘get out’. 
Author: Have you gone for a sunvaiyi? 
Laxman: No, I have not gone to anyone with my problem. How can a poor person like 
me seek sunvaiyi? You need money for this. 
Sonadevi: if you have four paise, what would you do? Seek sunvaiyi or buy food for 
your family and children?  
Laxman: you need money for travel. 
Sonadevi: We don’t have enough food, so how can we think about going around 
seeking sunvaiyi? 
Laxman: Anyway, what is the point of it all? We will only come back with a fallen 
face.  
This popular perception of the government-people relation is best captured by the local 
proverb: “hakim ke aghadi aur ghodeke pichadi na jaiyyo” (do not walk in front of an officer 
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or behind a horse), meaning in both the cases you will be kicked or some adversity will befall 
you! It also suggests the lack of trust that poor people have in government officials.  
In other words, the rules of access to the social protection entitlements were not always 
straightforward. They were mediated through intermediary gatekeepers which in turn led to 
trust deficits and scepticism in getting justice from higher officials.  
3.3.3Negotiation with structures of power: Hunger, vulnerability, reciprocity and moral 
economies 
Several households were faced with the imminent issue of hunger and impoverishment after 
the floods and erosion in 2007 and 2008. Our survey data as shown in Table 1 gives the food 
and economic position of the households in the four flooded villages.  
Table 1: Food and economic position of the household after floods of 200711 
 Food and economic position Upper 
castes 
Intermediate 
Castes  
Low or 
Scheduled 
castes 
(SC) 
1 Economic position has worsened after floods 97 96 98 
2 They had enough food to eat before the floods 84 77 80 
3 They did not  have enough food to eat after the 
floods 
83 80 79 
4 Eating less as a strategy used to cope with the 
food scarcity after floods 
93 90 93 
 
                                                          
11
 All decibels in the tables used in this paper have been rounded off to its nearest whole numbers.  
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Table 1 shows economic position as well as access to food had worsened across castes after 
floods.  Eating less was the common strategy used to deal with this situation of food scarcity 
after floods.   
This issue of hunger faced by people impoverished after floods and erosion forms the main 
backdrop against which people strategize ways to access governmental benefits. In 
Ghagrapur, hunger or poverty created vulnerabilities as well as dependencies on the dominant 
or richer classes in the villages, as loans, or karja are taken from these groups to overcome 
the situations of need: such as food consumption, or social occasions such as marriages, or 
health problems and illnesses. In the survey, a large number of people (57 percent of upper, 
66 percent of low/scheduled  and 64 percent of intermediate castes) were found to be in debt, 
and had used loans as a coping strategy to deal with the impacts of floods. Debts were found 
to be higher among the low/scheduled castes followed by intermediate, and least amongst the 
upper castes. 
Strategies or tactics of bargaining are used by poor people, to negotiate with the structures of 
power rather than by covert or overt protest in order to access governmental benefits. In this 
respect, they are closer to the strategies used by women as suggested by Kandiyoti in her 
classic paper ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti, 1988). 
Consider the case of Kamaladevi a poor elderly widow of about 70 years, and Narayan a 
blind man aged 38 who gave part of their first instalment of their respective widow and 
disability pension that they received to an influential person. In both the case, influential 
person mediated to get the pension that both were genuinely entitled to. This is an example of 
a very common strategy, used by poor women and men. Whilst in official terms their action 
may be called colluding in corruption, for Kamaladevi and Narayan, it is a pragmatic 
compromise, a negotiation, which would give them some long term security or support.  
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Although the amounts given in social protection schemes are meagre, their importance cannot 
be underestimated.  They are what sometimes, keep poor people from being pushed into 
starvation deaths in crisis situations such as flood or erosions, and what enable old people or 
those with disability to retain a measure of dignity whilst living with their children and 
extended families.  
Following the September 2008 floods, the Government of Uttar Pradesh (UP), based on their 
assessments distributed food relief to each flood and erosion affected household. The food 
bundle consisted of 20 kg of rice - and other food items. The criterion used to distribute this 
food bundle was one food bundle per household irrespective of number of people residing in 
it, and was given to the head of the household12.  This in itself caused the  official 
government policy followed by the UP government in food relief distribution, to be 
discriminatory towards widowed women, as food bundle was given to one identified by adult 
male as its head. Thus, a widowed woman staying with her adult sons, but cooking separately 
was not given a separate food relief bundle but was considered to get her share from the food 
relief bundle, that her son got as the head of the household. This puts widowed women at a 
disadvantage. Thus, a poor widow Janaki, belonging to a low or scheduled caste, and aged 
65, felt discriminated against by this practice and had raised the issue in her village without 
much success: “I have four sons, who have received separate food bundles, but they have 
their own families. Will they look after them or after me?” Similar norms were applied to 
house assistance benefits following their destruction in floods13. Here too, although Janaki 
was living in a small family shed/hut where she cooked separately, different from her four 
sons, she was considered to be living with one of her sons and denied a separate housing 
assistance following the 2007 floods.  
                                                          
12
 The current eligibility criteria set by UP government and procedures to access them is the same as in 2008, 
when field data was collected.  
13
 The current eligibility criteria set by the UP government and procedures to access them is the same as in 
2008, the only difference being the upward revision of amount of cash given for destruction of houses. 
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Yet, in the same village, two other poor widows, although living with their adult sons and 
belonging to the low/schedule castes, were able to access a separate housing assistance and 
food relief bundle from the distributing authorities as the Pradhan of the village treated them 
as living in separate households. Now, why did the Pradhan extend this benefit to these two 
poor widows and not to Janaki? The answer lies in the social connection that the families of 
these two poor widows have with the Pradhan’s household as compared to that of Janaki. A 
large amount of time is spent by many poor families in establishing a social relationship with 
influential persons in their village. This social relationship is established by poorer women 
who spend social time with women from better off households by helping them sometimes in 
their housework, or simply visiting them and exchanging courtesies, so that this social 
relationship could help them in times of distress or want. Similarly men from poorer 
households would do some occasional ‘free’ work for influential families or invite the 
influential person for social ceremonies in their houses, a way of showing respect to them. 
This emotional work invested in building social networks and relationships with influential 
persons, then gives them access to government programme benefits, to which they are 
anyway entitled, but for which, because they have no access to its gate-keepers, they are 
powerless to bargain. Similarly, it is this emotional work with influential or richer groups that 
enable them to negotiate for a timely loan on a concessional basis in case of emergency or 
dire need. For example, the analysis of our survey data shows that, whilst 24 percent of upper 
castes, 35 percent of low/scheduled castes and 42 percent of intermediate castes had taken out 
loans at the standard local monthly interest rate of 10 percent, 15 percent of upper castes, 19 
percent of low/scheduled castes and 15 percent of intermediate castes were able to take out 
loans on concessional interest rates below the standard 10 percent.   
This complex relation-building behaviour is called bhav-vyavhar in the village as it 
comprises both a behavioural (vyavhar) and an emotional (bhav) relationship with the 
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influential groups, Hari, a male aged 50 and from a chamar caste, a low or scheduled caste 
explained how this relationship works:    
Hari: “Village X has a moneylender. I will go to him, do a one day’s free labour such 
as doing repair of fencing, or roofs, or any other work that may be needed. I will not 
take money for this work. Then when I have a need, he will lend me some 
money...bhav-vyavhar is like this. When you have a need, I come to your rescue, and 
when I have a need, you help me out. This is what happens in our rural areas... 
Author: So do you work for this person till you have paid off the loan? 
Hari: No no... it does not work in that way. I would go and help him in his work, even 
when the loan is paid off.  I go since we have a bhav-vyavhar. Again I may have a 
need of Rs 10-20/- on some other day and I may have to ask him for help. For 
example, you have come, and now that I have a need, I give you a long welcome,  but 
when my need is over, that is, after you have done my work, I don’t do Namaste 
[welcome] to you, then it is not right. That Namaste which continues all through the 
life is good...this is bhav-vyavhar in our village. It is not based on force or fight”. 
Another person, Laxman, a male aged 36 and from a low/scheduled caste, recounted how he 
had received a loan from a upper caste person in his village at a concessional monthly rate of 
interest, of  four percent while the general monthly rate of interest in the village was ten 
percent as he had a “bhavvyavhar” relation with him. Several other persons from low or 
schedule caste and intermediate caste groups also reported a special relationship of bhav-
vyavhar with an influential person who in turn helped them out in ‘extra-special’ ways.  
Mala, a woman aged 35 from Luniya, an intermediate caste, explained how the vyavhar she 
had built over the last 4-5 years, with one family from an upper-caste group in her village had 
26 
 
in turn helped her get food for her family during the floods. The vyavhar was built through 
doing work for this family in return for wages. Mala recounted:  
“they had come once to my part of the village asking whether anybody would do 
labour work for them. I told them, that I would do the work. Since then, we have 
vyavhar between us. That’s all...it works in this way. When there is any work, they 
call me, such as cutting or threshing of paddy, or wheat. I do their work, they give me 
wages. I don’t have vyavhar with any other family...I went to ask for food to them 
during the floods. I don’t go to others as I don’t feel they will help me...I only went to 
this family”  
In other words, a lot of emotional and physical work was invested by poorer women and men 
in the maintaining and sustaining of social relationships with richer or influential persons in 
the village. These emotional investments in turn helped them in securing such fringe benefits 
as are recounted above: an added separate food relief bundle, or housing assistance for the 
widow in a household; or a loan at a concessional rate; or some food in times of need. The 
emotional work done by the poorer groups in order to develop emotional social ties with 
persons from richer or influential groups in the village are an important strategy through 
which poor and otherwise excluded families negotiate their way: in order to survive or 
receive government benefits, which they in any case should get as a matter of right. Similar 
observations were made by informants where bhav-vyavhar was instrumental in enabling 
access to other government schemes such as widows, old age or disability pensions and other 
schemes.  
These negotiating strategies by the poorer and marginalised groups can be better understood 
if one locates them further within the local context of power and powerlessness. To 
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understand the power dynamics further, the survey data in Table 2 is analysed on the 
government support accessed by different caste groups following 2007 floods.  
Table 2: Support accessed from the government following 2007 floods:  
 Support from the government following floods Upper 
castes 
Intermediate 
castes  
Low or 
Scheduled 
castes 
(SC) 
1 Cash support received from the government 52 % 33% 36% 
2 Service support (e.g health care) received from 
the government 
45% 35% 33% 
3 Material support such as food relief received 
from the government 
67% 68% 63% 
 
Table 2 shows that the upper castes fared better over other lower castes in accessing cash and 
service support from the government.  Scheduled or low castes received least food, material 
and service support from the government.  
Additionally, although across caste high damage to property and livelihoods were reported 
(96 percent upper, 97 percent low/scheduled,  and 99 percent intermediate), degree of cash 
support received by these groups showed variability as shown in the Table 3.  
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Table 3: Cash support received by the groups following floods of 2007  
 Amount of cash received Upper Castes Intermediate 
castes  
Low or 
Scheduled Castes 
(SC) 
2 Up to 1500 rupees 61% 72% 75% 
3 1501-5000 rupees 21% 23% 22% 
4 5001+ rupees 18% 5% 3% 
 Total 100 100 100 
 
Table 3 shows that of all those who received cash support, the low/scheduled castes and the 
intermediate castes received proportionately lower amounts of money than the upper castes. 
18 percent of upper castes received more than 5000 rupees as cash support as compared to 3 
percent of low/scheduled castes and 5 percent of intermediate castes. Generally speaking, this 
suggests that persons from the upper castes had better access to government benefit provision 
than those from the scheduled or intermediate castes.  Further, connections with influential 
and powerful persons were considered universally important by all caste groups for the 
purpose of obtaining government relief support. 86 percent of upper, 83 percent of low 
/scheduled caste and 89 percent of intermediate castes felt that people who had better 
connections with powerful groups got more relief and rehabilitation benefits than others. This 
explains further, why investment of emotional work in developing and maintaining 
relationships with influential persons through bhav-vyavhar is considered an important 
negotiating strategy by the impoverished persons in the villages.  
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The most important aspect of the bhav-vyavhar relation is that by its very nature, the 
relationship demands a reciprocal action from each person – albeit of different kinds. Both, in 
this case recognise the unequal relationship between the two in terms of resources and power. 
It is understood that the person in an influential position will reciprocate the emotional 
sentiment shown by poor persons by showing extra care towards for them as compared to 
others. As reciprocity of actions is the core sentiment behind bhav-vyavhar of this kind, it is 
called as “localised notion of entitlement” in this paper, in the sense that both the parties 
considered themselves ‘entitled’ to give to each-other according to requirements of their 
respective needs in the researched context. 
The reciprocity of non-equivalent goods (Sahlins, 1965a, 1965b) meant that whilst the patron 
gave food items or petty cash or facilitated access to social protection benefit, the reciprocal 
action was often seen in terms of labour, and symbolic behaviour of care and friendship 
towards each-other. It was also observed that the poorer classes are mobilised by the richer 
patron not only for work, during times of labour scarcity, but also during a local feud to 
maintain their sphere of dominance or influence over wider networks.  
The notion of bhav-vyavhar as localised notions of entitlements is thus different from statist 
notions of entitlements but has important consequences for the way in which state 
entitlements are actualised. The outcome in terms of who gets what is thus dependent upon 
how the statist notion of entitlement is mobilised through localised notions of entitlement: in 
this case, through a relation of bhav-vyavhar between persons in unequal socio-economic 
positions.  
To the extent that these negotiations are based on certain localised notions of entitlements, 
they can be said to be a part of what James Scott (1976) calls the ‘moral economy’. Scott 
(1976, p. 184) suggests that in a pre-capitalist normative order a “guarantee of minimal social 
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rights in the absence of political or civil rights” is expected from elites or well-off neighbours 
by the peasantry. However, in the above cases, the moral economy of the researched villages 
is guided more by normative concerns which arise not from a generalised notion of care for 
poorer neighbours by village elites  as described by Scott, but from individualised and special 
relationships of reciprocity built with meticulous care by the poor in order to mobilize a 
better deal from the better off  influential persons or patrons in their village. In that sense, the 
relationship can be described more as a negotiating strategy than what according to Scott’s 
research is a generalised social right enjoyed by the poor.   
Further, these relations of unequal exchange although similar to a patron-client relation, are 
different from traditional forms of it in India: as exhibited through either Jajmani relations 
(Gould, 1981; Dumont, 1998) or relations of bonded, unfree or semi-attached labour-landlord 
relation (Breman, 1974; 2007). Dumont calls Jajmani a division of labour in traditional India 
in which landless castes access their means of subsistence from the landed by performing a 
ritual or a function that the landed caste requires (Dumont, 1998). In the researched area, such 
Jajmani relations were almost non-existent. Further no  organised system of bonded labour-
landlord was found, although  it was here observed that “Karja”, or the debt did lead to 
landless labourers doing certain free labour or work at lowered wages for the landowner till 
the Karja was paid back. However, these relations were not recognised as bhav-vyavhar 
either by the landowner or by the labourer, as they did not have the symbolic elements of 
affection and care, or  have an element of obligation or reciprocity towards each-other. Many 
such relations were more in line with the casualization of labour (Platteau, 1995) where debts 
were taken at a market interest rate and paid back  through labour or in cash. Such casual 
relations are also found in several other districts of Uttar Pradesh (Parker and Kozel 2007). 
To sum up, the relations of bhav-vyavhar observed in Ghagrapur enable both parties to cope 
with their respective risks and also to extend their spheres of influence in social and political 
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life after the event of disasters, albeit in uneven ways. In that sense, as a local notion of 
entitlement, bhav-vyavhar can be seen as a negotiating strategy used by the marginalised and 
the dominant groups alike to master the risks felt by these groups in the researched area. 
More generally, though, poorer groups have used it as a bargaining strategy to access social 
protection benefits, to which they are anyway entitled to, but are unable to access without the 
backing of an influential gatekeeper in the village.  
To conclude, the narrative from the thematic findings in this section shows how access 
to social protection entitlements is mediated through moral economies and local 
political economies at work. The empirical analysis also shows that rather than the idea 
of entitlements as grounded in abstract social contract, it is the moral contracts of 
reciprocal exchanges with influential patrons, that enable the poor to ground their 
entitlement claims. As such, it is the framework of cultures of entitlements (figure 1) that 
best explains the entitlement outcomes rather than the social contract based entitlement thesis 
of Sen.   
4. Evaluating politics of access to entitlements: Revisiting the idea of entitlement and its 
implications for social protection programming in the light of the empirical findings 
The paper’s main finding is that, social protection entitlement outcomes and cultures of 
entitlement are closely related. Given this reality, access to social protection by the poor is 
dependent upon their ability to negotiate through the rules of access mediated through local 
political economies, moral economies, and social protection programme guidelines as 
indicated in our conceptual framework, figure 1.  
Based on this finding, the paper argues that current conception of entitlement as applied to 
social protection is inadequate to develop successful social protection programme regimes in 
places where the state-citizenry social contract does not work to its fullest, and where non-
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state rules and obligations trump over the former. One such place is also Afar and Somali 
areas of Ethiopia where pastoralists live and where distribution channels of social protection 
are impacted by social practices such as mutual support networks and informal authority 
structures that impact social protection targeting decisions (Sabates-Wheeler, Lind, Hoddinott 
2013).   
Our findings thus call for a re-interpretation of entitlements and a new conceptual framing 
that contextualises them within the social worlds, social relations and social subjectivities of 
the marginalised persons. This papers conceptual framework (figure 1) is a contribution 
towards development of such understanding, highlighting the analytical significance of 
notions such as moral economy and local political economy in social protection entitlement 
analysis.  
The paper’s empirical findings highlight that it is the cultural entitlements that mediate access 
rather than an impartial access as implied in social contract. Since poor are dis-empowered 
vis a vis state, in affirming their rights through formal channels, they seek other non-
institutionalised spaces to claim them. This was also seen in Tamilnadu after the tsunami 
where affected people used informal networks rather than formal channels to access 
governmental resources (Kruks-Wisner, 2011). Similarly in Delhi slums, informal authority 
is used to gain access to government services (Jha, Rao and Woolcock  (2007). It also shows 
the limits of the ‘passive revolution’, which the Indian state has led, in its attempts to be 
autonomous from the landed elites, wherein the state, as Chatterjee argues is yet to be 
transformed into an ‘authentic modernity’ with impartial bureaucracy (Chatterjee, 2011 p.23). 
In another instance, in her  study about the reach of social security schemes and welfare 
programmes in three villages in Tamilnadu, Harris-White concludes that in the light of 
political influence it is difficult for the bureaucracy to be neutral in its identification of the 
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beneficiaries, as a result the ‘officials lose authority as representatives of the state’ (Harris-
White, 2004 p.456).  
Given the evidence of cultures of entitlement from our paper, what is the potential to 
transform access to social protection in equitable ways?  
Current theorizations argue that the best way forward is through deepening transparency 
through the right to information act 2005, and  initiatives such as social audits in 
governmental programmes such as NREGA (Kidambi, 2011; Koehler, 2011; Vij, 2011; De 
Haan et al, 2009; Jayal, 2008; Reddy et al, 2010). However the implementation of such 
transparency and social audit initiatives remains weak on the ground (Gopal, 2009). Research 
also shows that in places where there are organisations of the poor, they are  able to more 
effectively access social protection benefits (Reddy et al 2010;   Joshi, 2010; Pattendan, 2011; 
Pande, 2008). Participatory governance or hybrid governance initiatives that foster 
collaboration between state representatives and community through programmes are also 
suggested as a best way forward in implementing social protection programmes effectively 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; Vij, 2011; Fox, 2015; Mishra et al, 2010; Ackerman, 2004; Jayal  
2008; Spink and Best, 2009).  
While these are useful suggestions, it is worthwhile reflecting and learning from the strategies 
employed by mass organisations such as Kashtakari Sanghatana, and Majdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sanghatan (MKSS), organisations working with the rural poor in Maharashtra and Rajasthan 
respectively in India14. Some of the best works around successful access to social protection 
and welfare programmes has been led by them.   
                                                          
14
The first author has a personal knowledge of work of Kashtakari Sanghatana and MKSS. Also see 
http://www.mkssindia.org/ and http://www.copasah.net/kashtakari-sanghatana.html 
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These organisations organise the marginalised for affirmation of their rights. However there 
is a difference in the way in which a rights based struggle such as MKSS engages with the 
discourse of ‘entitlements’ and ‘rights’ and the abstract conceptualisation of ‘entitlements’ 
through notions of social contract.  Organisations such as MKSS realise rights and 
entitlements through every day collective struggle of the poor.  Rights are discourses15, to be 
realised through a collective agency of the marginalised rather than treated as abstract things 
vested in an atomised individual agency mediated through an abstract social contracts.  The 
innovations made by MKSS in 1990s such as Jan sunvaiyi (public hearings), supported 
through social mobilisation has led to major legislative breakthrough such as passing of the 
right to information act 2005 by the Indian government.  In Jansunvaiyi, expenditures on 
public works such as NREGA are shared in public village level meetings, thereby checking 
corruption thus enforcing a transparency on the governmental system.   Articulation of such 
innovative rights practices were a direct result of their collective everyday struggle for fair 
wages for labourers who had worked on public works.  
Reflecting on the idea of Jansunvaiyi the leaders of the MKSS led movement, Aruna Roy, 
Nikhil Dey and Shankar Singh (1997, p. 84), have stated ‘The public hearings  have….. given 
tangible quality to the abstract notion of transparency and right to information’ (emphasis 
our). Their struggle has led them to argue that ‘Information is ….an important entitlement 
because withholding information weakens the foundations of struggles’ of the marginalised 
(ibid, Roy et al, 1997, p. 84). In the last several years, MKSS and allied groups have 
continued mass mobilisation for deepening accountability and are now demanding a new 
legislative act; namely right to accountability.  The act will ask for clear specification of work 
responsibilities of bureaucrats/public servants in relation to different social protection 
                                                          
15
 The idea of discourse overcomes the divide between an abstract  theory and practice. It questions the idea 
of ‘truth’ being out there but suggests that it is produced through various social and knowledge based 
practices.  Organisations such as MKSS articulate critical rights practices through their everyday struggles of 
poor.  
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programmes, and imposition of penalties on officials in case of service delays from them. On 
the 10th March 2016, thousands of people marched to Rajasthan state assembly in India 
demanding an enacting of an Accountability act16. 
We contend that this current demand for accountability as an entitlement led by MKSS and 
other allied social action groups can be conceptualised  as an articulation of a new cultural 
entitlement, not captured by Sen’s  conception of entitlements which is limited to economic 
entitlements  (whether production-based, labour-based, trade-based and transfer-based) . 
Building upon the current struggles of the social movements in India, we suggest that Sen’s 
own entitlement thesis which is pitched at transfer of economic entitlements,  through social 
protection from the state to the poor is inadequate. Lessons from social movements suggests 
that information transparency and accountability as new cultural entitlements, can arguably 
be used to counter the cultures of entitlements discussed in this paper. As Melucchi (1985); 
Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998), and Bebbington (2007) have contended, social 
movements struggle over dominant meanings and practices, and institutions which sustains 
them.  Information transparency when combined with accountability as new cultural 
entitlement, and when mobilized through collective agency of the marginalised, can 
potentially mobilise the current bureaucratic culture and institutions into delivering 
them the social protection entitlements currently  denied.  
In other words, the cultures of entitlements, evidenced in our study can be overcome only 
when tangible and new cultures of entitlements such as information transparency and 
accountability take roots.  This may take a long time, as there are no quick fixes for the same. 
For rights based NGOs it means working with the marginalised groups on the ground, 
                                                          
16
The first author has also met Aruna Roy and Shankar Singh on 10
th
 January, 2016 in person, in Ahmedabad, 
India, where they spoke about their current campaign for right to accountability act. An accountability yatra 
(rally) has been led by them in Rajasthan covering hundreds of villages from 1
st
 December 2015-10
th
 March 
2016.  
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supporting their everyday struggle for new cultural entitlements through actions of solidarity. 
It calls for a commitment to a long term haul/engagement rather than only a project based 
engagement with the poor on the part of NGOs.   
Conclusions: 
The reflections from this paper argue against the simplistic extension of Sen’s notion of 
entitlements or right to social protection programming. It shows that in places where the 
social contract does not work to its fullest, those who are culturally entitled reap maximum 
benefits. Current experiences from social movements suggest that a struggle for tangible 
new cultural entitlements, in particular formulation of accountability act is the way 
forward. Rights based organisations which campaign with such awareness are most 
likely to succeed in their bid to achieve equitable reach of social protection programmes 
in practice.  
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